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ABSTRACT 
This position paper sketches an approach to improving land redistribution in 
South Africa in which the broad aim is to use redistribution to create a range of 
livelihood opportunities, in meaningful numbers, in proportion to the 
understood need. The approach laid out in the paper is informed first and 
foremost by a reflection on South Africa’s land reform to date, which among 
other things requires contemplation of the respective strengths and limitations 
of government and other role-players, and market-based versus other 
mechanisms. The main argument is that government can and must play an active 
role to ensure that land reform caters to the demand for small farms on which to 
create opportunities for commercially-oriented smallholders, and for small plots 
for those whose primary need is tenure and food security. Somewhat different 
mechanisms can serve the interests of those seeking help through land reform to 
expand into large-scale farming. The paper illustrates/estimates how these 
diverse needs could be addressed in a balanced manner, and met in significant 
numbers given a larger budget for land redistribution, which is not unimaginable 
given the current budget’s negligible size. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This position paper attempts to sketch a realistic, simple (fairly) and coherent 
(hopefully) approach to improving land redistribution in South Africa. The broad aim is 
to use redistribution to create a range of livelihood opportunities, in meaningful 
numbers, in proportion to the understood need. The proposed approach also takes 
seriously the need to racially transform the commercial agricultural sector, even though 
in truth the livelihood benefits of doing so will be very modest. The paper is not 
particularly concerned with furthering a given hectarage target; however, the symbolic 
importance of hectares is acknowledged. 
 
The approach laid out in the paper is informed first and foremost by a reflection on 
South Africa’s land reform to date, which of course is assisted by others’ research on the 
same. The paper follows the useful structure that was suggested for all the position 
papers presented at the land redistribution conference.1 An important underlying 
theme/question is the role of government and other role-players, and market-based 
versus other mechanisms, bearing in mind their respective strengths and limitations. 
2. WHO SHOULD BENEFIT FROM LAND REDISTRIBUTION IN 
RURAL SOUTH AFRICA? 
One of the key failings of redistribution to date has been the lack of clarity as to who is 
targeted to benefit from it, or the inability to actually apply whatever 
targeting/categorisation scheme has been proposed.2 This has allowed a drift towards 
larger-scale projects, that is, in which relatively large amounts of land are allocated to 
one or a few beneficiaries. This is problematic for various reasons, but most importantly, 
because: (i) ultimately, few people benefit from land redistribution, i.e. within a given 
annual budget envelope; and (ii) the most prevalent type of land need is neglected, 
which is the need for small parcels  of land for tenure and food security.3  
 
Why is there this persistent upward drift? One reason appears to be that government 
officials have a conscious or unconscious belief that large-scale commercial agriculture 
is ‘real agriculture’, and of course large-scale commercial farmers typically declare that 
they have to be large (and ever larger) in order to survive.4 Another reason appears to 
be pressure from would-be beneficiaries, which is especially strong from relatively well-
to-do individuals who aspire to become large-scale (or larger-scale) commercial 
farmers. In other words, even though we are fairly certain that most people who want 
                                                             
1 Resolving the Land Question: Land redistribution for equitable access to land in South Africa, 4-5 February 2019, UWC, Cape Town. The 
author would like to thank PLAAS for the opportunity to contribute to and participate in the conference, and the various other participants for 
the thoughtful and constructive engagement. 
2 Regarding the latter, the State Land Lease Policy indicates that government should target 4 categories of redistribution beneficiaries. 
However, it is not clear that these categories have been applied in any meaningful way. Among other things, there is no declaration of intent 
as to how resources should be apportioned across the different categories. The fact that the policy speaks of both farmer categories (generally 
ranging from small-scale to large-scale), as well as a variety of other priority types (e.g. military veterans, women, and people with 
disabilities), perhaps does not help. 
3 For a good, brief summary, see Hall (2013).  
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land, want relatively small parcels, this need is not loudly and forcefully articulated 
because this constituency is neither well connected nor well organised.  
 
Does this mean that smallholder-focused land redistribution should be premised on the 
notion that small farmers are more productive and labour-intensive as per the ‘inverse 
farm-size productivity hypothesis’? No and yes. No: it is not my position that land 
redistribution should be exclusively focused on ‘smallholders’, rather it should seek to 
accommodate a range of land needs. And No: it is difficult to make the case that small-
scale farms in South Africa are more productive, i.e. in terms of output per hectare. But 
Yes: there is certainly evidence that smaller farms in South Africa are more labour-
intensive, even within the so-called large-scale commercial farm sector, and this matters 
greatly in a country that is largely food self-sufficient, but in which there is rampant 
unemployment and household-level food insecurity. Moreover, accommodating 
commercially-oriented small-scale farmers means giving an opportunity to tens or 
hundreds of thousands of black farmers who have been doing the best they can within 
the confines of the former homelands for others (Cousins, 2015), thus allowing them to 
make better use of their talents and potentially freeing up space within the former 
homelands (i.e. especially in terms of access to grazing resources).  
 
But beyond the agricultural economics of land redistribution, there are the livelihoods 
and social aspects of redistribution. People need well-located homes from which to 
pursue livelihood strategies, and despite the concern for settlement sprawl, the reality is 
that many people prefer peri-urban or semi-rural sites because they value the rural 
lifestyle, and/or want to avoid the high costs and other challenges associated with living 
in cities.5 Accommodating this need through land redistribution is arguably a superior 
alternative to developing peri-urban Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) settlements, which usually fail to take space for gardening or the keeping of 
livestock into account. Moreover, giving large numbers of people more opportunity to 
exercise choice, will do far more to empower women than supposedly stringent gender 
targeting in the context of a programme where there are only tiny numbers of 
beneficiaries. 
 
So if we want to aim at a spectrum of land needs/beneficiary types, how do we 
categorise them? I suppose there is a need to have some system of categories, but I 
doubt it is wise to vest too much importance in any particular system; it is not as though 
people’s needs fall into neat, discrete packages that can be clearly identified and which 
are stable over time. In other words, there is no ‘correct’ system of categories that can 
precisely mirror the reality on the ground while still being useful for purposes of 
implementation. But we do need something, and for now I would propose the following 
very simple and rough categorisation: 
 
• Settlement-oriented beneficiaries – roughly 0.1 to 1 hectare per household;  
                                                             
5 See e.g. Mondi (2018) for a case study of a peri-urban informal settlement near East London. One might ask whether it’s perhaps already 
too late to try to cater to this type of demand, in the sense that hundreds of thousands of households have already voted with their feet, raising 
the challenge of what to do in light of this. The answer is that there is no reason to believe that this need/demand has been exhausted, and the 
sooner we demonstrate positive alternatives to unplanned, unsupported, extra-legal peri-urban settlement, the better. The approach endorsed 
here is what is sometimes called ‘managed land settlement’ (see e.g. Afesis-corplan, 2011). Another question is whether catering to this 
demand is what is already happening by means of the ‘1 Household, 1 Hectare’ (1HH, 1H) programme. Unfortunately, it is difficult to know 
given the dearth of information about how this programme is being implemented. From my one DRDLR-based source who has contributed 
to the implementation of ‘1 HH,1 HA’, it appears to be a highly projectised programme involving collective farming and appointed farm 
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• Small-scale farmers – roughly 1 to 50 hectares per household of arable land, but 
for grazing allowing for up to 40 large-stock units, including on commonage 
projects;6  
• Large-scale farmers – roughly 50 to 500 hectares per household of arable land, 
but for grazing allowing for over 40 large-stock units. 
 
A proposed apportionment between these three types could be very approximately as 
follows: 
Table 1: Proposed/illustrative apportionment between different beneficiary types 
Type Number share Hectares share Expenditure 
share 
Smallholders Settlement-oriented 75% 3% 15% 
Small-scale farmers 22% 26% 32% 
Large-scale farmers 3% 71% 53% 
 
A few observations follow from this: 
 
• The scheme assumes that the cost per hectare is far higher for settlement-
oriented land than for land acquired for small-scale farmers, which in turn is 
assumed to be far more expensive per hectare than land acquired for large-scale 
farming. This has to do with the importance attached to location, as well as to the 
fact that both settlement-oriented projects and small-scale farmer projects 
should be accompanied by rudimentary infrastructure development. (However, it 
glosses over the fact that some opportunities meant for large-scale farming, 
might be on expensive irrigated land.) 
• Obviously, the scheme is designed in such a manner as to provide for relatively 
few people seeking opportunities for large-scale commercial farming, and yet this 
category would still account for the vast majority of hectares and a considerable 
share of overall expenditure. This is another way of saying that under such a 
scheme, the cost per beneficiary household will differ significantly from one 
beneficiary to another.7 
• This scheme is decidedly not focused on acquiring hectares, that is, it is not 
geared particularly towards advancing progress towards national hectarage 
                                                             
6 Not much detail is provided in this short paper about the role of commonage projects. In short, a ‘commonage project’ is where land is 
acquired by the state and vested in an appropriate entity (e.g. municipality or traditional authority) to be accessed by designated community 
members, generally for livestock farming. Commonage projects are clearly applicable to small-scale livestock farmers, but could also be 
used to complement settlement projects. 
7 No doubt people will disagree with the ‘balance’ suggested here between the categories, for example that there is too much emphasis on 
settlement-oriented beneficiaries (‘Isn’t that a Human Settlements responsibility?’), or too large a share of the money spent on the few large-
scale farmer beneficiaries (‘Elites!’). This particular proposal is not aimed at fairness (the discrepancy in per household expenditure is in fact 
huge), rather it is trying to accommodate quite disparate objectives, each of which is important in its own way, and bearing in mind also the 
importance of social stability and restorative justice. (Paradoxically, the pro-poor agenda and the social stability agenda are not at all aligned; 
the widely shared sense that land reform has failed is more a function of too few hectares, regardless of to whom they were transferred and 
whether/how transferred land is being used; we can’t ignore this reality.) In any case, I certainly accept that the proportions could be 
different. As for my level of certainty regarding the underlying assumptions, e.g. regarding the cost per hectare associated with different 
beneficiary types, this would benefit from further work. One question put to me for instance, is whether the cost per hectare for small-scale 
farmers will necessarily be greater than that for large-scale farmers. I think so, yes, but the answer lies in large part on clarifying the package 
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targets. However, by virtue of catering to those seeking opportunities for large-
scale commercial farming, the scheme provides for the acquisition of reasonable 
numbers of hectares. While arbitrary hectarage targets should be de-emphasised, 
one must acknowledge the importance of public perceptions regarding the 
success of land reform in terms of changing the racial pattern of land ownership.  
 
Why households as a beneficiary unit, rather than individuals? It probably does not 
matter a great deal, but one reason to be wary of counting beneficiaries as ‘individuals’ 
is that the numbers of official individual beneficiaries are especially meaningless, 
because applicants claim arbitrary adult family members as beneficiaries for the sake of 
gaming the grant formula (if there is one); this was true from the early days of LRAD 
(Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development). 
 
 
Qualifying criteria will depend on the beneficiary/project type: 
 
• For settlement-oriented projects, there should be an application of a household 
income ceiling, as was the case with the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant 
(SLAG). The purpose is to not permit the dilution of the process by allowing 
middle-class people to acquire free land for settlement. 
 
• For small-scale farmer beneficiaries, some experience in agriculture is a 
requirement. 
 
• For large-scale farmer beneficiaries, a business plan, relevant experience, and 
own contribution are necessary. Something like the own-contribution formula 
from LRAD should be re-introduced. And by extension, this also implies that, 
unlike the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS), there must be a clear 
upper limit to the value of government’s contribution, whether this is in the form 
of land, grants, or both. 
3. HOW SHOULD LAND FOR REDISTRIBUTION BE 
IDENTIFIED, ACQUIRED AND TRANSFERRED? 
3.1  Considerations 
One of the things that we consistently underestimate in land reform is the extent to 
which the inner workings and even outcomes are unanticipated, generally because the 
programme design leads to patterns of implementation that are different to what was 
intended. In some cases this results in a range of outcomes which are narrower than 
what is provided for in the policy or programme. For example, under SLAG, the small 
size of the grant combined with the fact that it was a so-called demand-led programme, 
meant that in some, if not most provinces, projects were seller-driven, which was 
certainly not the intention, was barely acknowledged, and proved hugely problematic. 
 
As a second example, the design of LRAD explicitly allowed for the implementation of a 
wide variety of types of redistribution projects, including those involving subdivision. 
However, in practice subdivision was rarely if ever undertaken under LRAD, not least 
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queue. Additionally, the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) never invested the necessary 
effort to figure out how to go about, and when to promote, subdivision.  
 
Thereafter, PLAS was in large measure designed with two ideas in mind: that non-
performing beneficiaries would be replaced with new beneficiaries, and that the 
Department would assume responsibility for identifying suitable land for acquisition. 
However, non-performing PLAS beneficiaries have rarely been replaced (at least not for 
that particular reason), and at least in some provinces and in recent years, would-be 
beneficiaries are mainly responsible for identifying land to be acquired, in fact for 
securing offers of sale from owners. 
 
Even so, it is important to take stock of the positive lessons we have learnt from the 
implementation of land redistribution over the past two decades. 
 
• For one, from LRAD, we learned that many beneficiaries can make significant 
material contributions to their projects, and that it makes sense (where 
appropriate) to use grants to leverage own and/or loan finance.  
• A second positive lesson is that some would-be beneficiaries are perfectly 
capable of identifying land; these are more or less the same people who are able 
to make an own contribution. (At the same time, we also know that many more 
would-be beneficiaries are unable to do either, and therefore their participation 
in land redistribution should not be predicated on such.)  
• Third, from previous experience we know that there are some relatively effective 
and efficient ways of promoting access to land through the market (the so-called 
‘concentrated land acquisition approach’, which is discussed a bit more below). 
• And fourth, while the short-lived ‘agency arrangement’ with the Land Bank 
during the early phases of LRAD had its problems, it worked well enough to 
demonstrate the potential of the approach which, strangely, has not been 
properly revisited.  
 
It is important to pause at this juncture to consider what prevents people from acquiring 
small amounts of land for settlement through the current redistribution programme. 
First, to the extent that PLAS is still truly a pro-active, state-led process, then with few 
exceptions it is clear that catering to the need for small plots is not on government’s (or 
the DLRCs’) agenda. And second, to the extent that PLAS has reverted to a largely 
demand-led process (i.e. in the sense that would-be applicants are expected to identify 
the land themselves as a precondition for getting in the queue, as is the case generally in 
the Eastern Cape), the reason that small plots are not commonly allocated is seemingly 
because it is difficult for people to come together to scout for land that the state might 
acquire and subdivide on their behalf. 
 
The point is that, ensuring land is allocated in the form of small plots will require a 
deliberate strategy that takes into account both the ‘pro-commercial’ proclivities of 
officials, and the obstacles (e.g. transaction costs) that make it difficult for those wanting 
small amounts of land to get their need addressed through the existing land 
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On the basis of these considerations, it is logical to suggest that the wide spectrum of 
needs as suggested in the previous section, will require a differentiated approach. In a 
nutshell, a genuinely pro-active, pro-poor, state-led approach should apply to the many 
people needing small plots (settlement-oriented and small-scale farmers), whereas for 
large-scale farmers a demand-led, LRAD-esque approach should apply. The idea behind 
this mixed approach is to focus the state’s limited administrative capacity where it is 
most needed – i.e. for the benefit of smallholders – and reduce it where it can be, which 
is where large-scale farming opportunities are concerned. Overall, yes, an increase in 
state capacity will be required (e.g. commensurate with the increase in government 
budget which is also necessary – see below), but the main thing is to use whatever 
capacity exists more intelligently. 
 
To what extent can we rely on either social movements, Civil Society Organisations 
(CSOs), or the private sector to compensate for the limitations in state capacity? For 
purposes of settling large-scale commercial farmers, I see a big role for the banks. But in 
terms of partnerships with agri-business, there is a finite supply of willing and qualified 
private sector partners. As for social movements and CSOs, particularly the latter could 
play an important role in assisting with processes around smallholder-focused projects.  
3.2 Land identification, part 1 
We need to go back to area-based planning, and we need to do it well, meaning simply, 
quickly and with purpose. The main issue is that area-based planning has to take much 
more seriously the need to understand land demand. Most of the rest of it is probably 
superfluous or at best secondary. And this effort should probably be done at local 
municipality level, because a district is far too large.8  
 
It is also important to point out that the more recent ‘Rural Development Plans’, which 
started to come out around 2015, do not seem to be much of an improvement on this 
score, indeed the ones I have seen for districts in the Eastern Cape (which perhaps are 
not representative?) offer virtually no meaningful guidance at all as to how land 
reform/redistribution should be pursued in the respective districts.  
 
Perhaps the problem with these exercises is that they are based on mainly secondary 
data, whereas by and large, no secondary data exist regarding people’s land needs. On 
the other hand, it should not be too terribly difficult to assess land needs.9 I would 
suggest that the development of these plans not be outsourced; they can be a normal 
function of Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) staff, and they 
should be updated annually. There presumably will have to be better coordination with 
local municipalities. 
 
                                                             
8 This is just one reason among others why the District Land Reform Committee (DLRC) policy did not work. A side question is whether the 
DLRCs should be retained, and if so, whether their role or working method should be modified somehow. Perhaps rather than being 
accorded a decision-making function that they are poorly placed to effect, the DLRCs should be consulted on occasion to review the progress 
with redistribution in their respective districts. The challenge is that a DLRC may or may not be sympathetic to the need to create 
opportunities for smallholders, depending on how it is constituted. 
9 An approach was proposed in HSRC (2017), “A Land Use and Needs Assessment Framework,” commissioned by the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform, and the Belgian Development Agency. It consisted of various possible activities, not least community 
meetings, focus group discussions, discussions with local government and traditional leaders, etc. But other signs of land need are readily 
visible, such as nascent informal settlements. Ideally, this function of identifying land needs would not be outsourced, but rather be done by 
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3.3 Land identification, part 2 
 
Land identification should in general be done differently for those wanting/needing 
small plots versus those wanting large farms: for the most part, for the former, the state 
should take the lead, guided by the area-based plan. Especially for settlement-oriented 
beneficiaries, a key consideration is how strategic the location is in respect of transport 
routes to town(s) or other service centres. The principle is that the location should 
contribute positively to a multiple-livelihoods strategy, especially given that there is no 
pretence that such beneficiaries will subsist mainly on agriculture. For small-scale 
farms, the key consideration is whether the property is suitable for subdivision, 
although location is also very important.10 For commonages, proximity to those in need 
of access to more grazing land is key. For large(r)-scale farming, the idea is that would-
be beneficiaries will know what they are looking for, while government’s job is to: (i) 
promote land availability; and (ii) subsidise land purchase.  
 
Regarding ways in which government can promote land availability, a key 
recommendation is that government should revisit and refine/adapt the ‘concentrated 
land acquisition approach’. Though it was not called this at the time, this is the approach 
concocted in the Eastern Cape in the early 2000s by a handful of individuals in the 
provincial agriculture department and the provincial office of the Department of Land 
Affairs. In essence, the approach consisted of two steps. Firstly, benchmark valuations 
were conducted in an area establishing what government was willing to pay per hectare 
for different kinds of land, while allowing minimal scope for negotiations regarding 
individual farms. Secondly, government initiated discussions with commercial farmers 
to let them know that the area was being targeted for land reform, and that the above-
mentioned benchmark values would be offered on a more or less ‘take it or leave it’ 
basis. The effect in Elliot District during the period 2002 to about 2006 was dramatic: 
about 20% of the land was acquired for redistribution, and land prices remained flat 
over this period whereas for the rest of the Eastern Cape they were rising rapidly.11 
While the approach has not been used deliberately again elsewhere, there are other 
instances where aspects of the approach were in effect, and to good effect, such as in the 
resolution of a number of restitution claims in Molemole Local Municipality, Limpopo.12 
 
In principle, this approach could be used quite flexibly. In Elliot, it was used in 
conjunction with LRAD, but it could also be used as part of a pro-active land acquisition 
approach. No doubt some experimentation is in order to figure out how to use the 




                                                             
10 Remarkably little work on this has been done within the DLA/DRDLR, reflecting the widespread antipathy to subdivision that has 
prevailed there over the years. Note that Act 126, which presumably is still invoked for most redistribution projects, provides for an 
automatic exemption to the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act.  
11 Elliot magisterial district is/was a commercial farming area, of which most was incorporated into Sakhisizwe Local Municipality, Eastern 
Cape.  
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3.4 Land acquisition 
 
One cannot discuss the issue of land acquisition without reference to the question of 
‘expropriation without compensation’ (‘EWOC’). However, that is a very involved 
discussion in itself, and is difficult to address not least because at this juncture we do not 
know what it will really look like. (See Appendix 1 for a brief reflection.) Here I only 
state my tentative conclusion: whether or not the proposed amendment to Section 25 of 
the Constitution is effected, but assuming that EWOC becomes national policy, it is 
unlikely that EWOC will accomplish a great deal in terms of accelerating redistribution, 
and still less in making it perform better. Therefore, faster and better redistribution will 
require more funding, which is not saying a great deal since at present it accounts for so 
little (see Appendix 2). On the other hand, ensuring that the money is spent well – and 
indeed that the programme is designed in such a way as to allow for faster delivery – 
requires some thought, beyond the use of the ‘concentrated land acquisition approach’ 
mentioned above.  
 
The proposal is that the redistribution programme simultaneously makes use of three 
main modes of land acquisition:13 
 
• Pro-active land acquisition through targeted expropriation, in particular for 
settlement-oriented projects. The rationale is that land for settlement-oriented 
projects has to be selected with great care, and the likelihood of suitable land 
being available on the market is modest-to-remote.14 The targeting of any 
particular land for expropriation should be rationalised by an area-based plan 
involving actual fieldwork that clarifies the need; and since expropriation is likely 
to remain an onerous process, it should be used minimally and judiciously. (By 
contrast, using targeted expropriation to help meet the needs of large-scale 
farmer beneficiaries could lead to toxic forms of rent-seeking.) 
 
• Pro-active land acquisition through the market, to meet the need especially for 
land for small-scale farmers and commonage projects, and where possible for 
settlement-oriented projects.   
 
• Applicant-led acquisition through the market, especially for large-scale farmers. 
This could/should be effected (in part? entirely?) through an agency 






                                                             
13 To clarify the use of terminology, ‘pro-active land acquisition’ as used here does not necessarily mean that the identified and acquired land 
become state land. What is meant is that the state (DRDLR) assumes responsibility for arranging for the acquisition of the land, which may 
well be transferred thereafter to another entity, e.g. a Communal Property Association (CPA). 
14 This is a reversal of a view I previously held, which was that within redistribution, there was more than enough land available on the 
market. See e.g. Hall (2009) for a critique of that position. 
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3.5 Land transfer 
 
In whose name is the land acquired? A number of issues must be considered here, all of 
which have been discussed many times before: 
 
• Some people feel that it is perverse not to allow land reform beneficiaries to 
become ‘owners’ of the land they are acquiring through land reform, as opposed 
to being tenants.16 
• Government wants to maintain some control over land reform land, especially in 
light of the real possibility of project failure,17 and/or the danger of beneficiaries 
choosing to re-sell land that they have acquired with the assistance of 
government subsidies. 
• Settlers with lease agreements struggle to access production loans, meaning 
either that they are unable to effectively use the land they are leasing, or that 
government must cover costs that might otherwise have been covered by loan 
finance. 
• Lease agreements on state-owned land imply an abiding administrative 
responsibility for government which at present government does not seem able 
to handle satisfactorily; a dramatically expanded/accelerated land reform 
programme that presumes more leasing of state-owned land is reason for 
concern.  
The perspective here, not surprisingly, is that the approach must be differentiated 
according to the beneficiary type:  
 
• For settlement-oriented projects, in which formal or informal subdivision would 
be effected on a per household basis,18 there is little or no rationale for lease 
agreements, mainly because ‘project failure’ does not have the same meaning that 
it has for production-oriented projects. If ‘failure’ were to occur in the sense that 
a few beneficiaries abandoned the land allocated to them, then they could easily 
be replaced; if a large number of beneficiaries were to abandon a piece of land 
allocated to them, then presumably something was seriously wrong with the 
selection of the land in the first place. As for the danger of re-selling, that depends 
on the specifics. The argument is that title should be transferred to a CPA, the 
main function of which is to administer the land on behalf of its members.19 This 
                                                             
16 See e.g. Hall (2014): “This is a policy that says that black people are not to be trusted with land.” Of course, those who favour a 
programme of land nationalisation seek equality by means of disallowing private ownership altogether, in effect favouring the idea that all 
land users are tenants. That proposal is not seriously considered here. 
17 In the context of production-oriented projects, it is worth thinking about ‘failure’ a bit more deeply than we normally do. In most of our 
discourse, project failure represents a blemish on the programme – something is wrong with how things are being done, perhaps with the 
planning, perhaps with beneficiary selection, and almost certainly with the post-settlement support. On the other hand, even if all of these 
were perfect, one could reasonably expect failure, especially in the first few years. This is the nature of small business, and of farming. This 
doesn’t mean we should be slack about planning, selection or post-settlement support, but neither should we be neurotic about them; more to 
the point, we have to get out of the habit of allowing failure to mean indefinitely idle land. This is another way of saying that the (apparent) 
original intention of PLAS made sense, at least in principle, only that it was never implemented. 
18 Possibly allowing for some of the land to be undivided land for common use, e.g. grazing. 
19 The troubled history of CPAs in South Africa’s land reform gives us little insight as to how they would perform in this scenario. CPAs 
have mainly been problematic either because they are operating within large, already-contentious restitution projects, or because they take it 
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might or might not be an intermediate step towards the formal subdivision of the 
land, in which case households would acquire title to their respective plots. 
Another option for settlement-oriented projects could in principle be absorption 
within an adjacent customary area. One downside with this option is that at this 
stage tenure reform in customary areas remains an unknown, thus it is unclear 
what one can say about the merit of such an option.  
• Small-scale farmer projects could follow the same route. One rationale for doing 
so is that small-scale farmers occupying subdivisions within a recently acquired 
farm, might well benefit from an institution such as a CPA to assist in managing 
common infrastructure or resources. The downside of this approach is that it is 
not clear at this stage how quickly some small-scale farmers will exit, and 
whether it will be a burden for a CPA to deal with a high rate of turnover.20 An 
alternative option is outright formal subdivision and transferring of the separate titles to 
the respective beneficiaries. The concerns with this approach are its upfront expense, 
and the possibility that beneficiaries will either re-sell or abandon the land. Regarding 
the possibility of re-selling, a covenant could be placed on the title deed restricting sale 
for a particular period and/or to non-beneficiaries.21 For most small-scale farmers, the 
general assumption is that, regardless of property rights, loan finance will play little if 
any role.22 (See section below on Support for beneficiaries.)  
• Land acquired for commonage projects needs to be vested in an entity that has the 
ability and inclination to manage it, which in the past has not always been an easy 
condition to fulfil, but for which it is difficult to think of an alternative to local 
municipalities.  
• For large-scale farmer beneficiaries, the assumption is that the beneficiary will gain 
freehold title. This is another way of saying that government will no longer be in the 








                                                                                                                                                                                              
CPAs, and it raises numerous challenges that CPAs are not equipped to handle. Having said that, I recognise that this distinction between 
what are and are not core functions of CPAs does not seem to be widely held. See for example the DRDLR’s recent CPA annual report 
(DRDLR, 2018), wherein the main sign cited that CPAs are performing well seems to be that they are managing productive projects. 
20 More so than the other land redistribution ‘models’ described here, this one is a virtual unknown. The expectation is that there would need 
to be a lot of quick learning in the early days of attempting to implement it.  
21 I’m bluffing. I have no idea if this is possible.  
22 An alternative option would be long-term leases with an option to purchase; the question is, who is likely to manage the land better, a CPA 
or DRDLR? Tough one.  
23 I’ve previously taken the view that the original vision of PLAS had a lot of promise. Even though former Minister of Rural Development 
and Land Reform, Gugile Nkwinti exaggerated the failure rate of land redistribution projects, project failure was (and is) real, and a big 
problem with the programme was that it lacked a mechanism to replace beneficiaries who couldn’t make it with new candidates. This is the 
principle of ‘tough love’ – you get a chance, but if you don’t make it then you have to make way for someone else. But I’m starting to accept 
that it’s never going to happen, because exercising tough love is seemingly very difficult for a democratic government to do under current 
circumstances, even if it all it requires is choosing not to renew a lease, and replacing one tenant with another. An inevitable but not 
insuperable point of conflict in these cases is that a non-performing or non-paying tenant can claim that they were unable to produce due to 
inadequate government support. See for example the controversy that sprung up in 2009 when former Minister of Land Affairs, Lulu 
Xingwana, attempted to implement the ‘use it or lose it’ policy, e.g. Lawyers for Human Rights (2009). And if tough love is not going to be 
applied, then what is the point of leasing land to beneficiaries rather than transferring it to them outright? Unfortunately, that means that 
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The figure below seeks to summarise schematically what is being proposed regarding 
the delivery approaches for the three main beneficiary types. 
 




4. WHAT KINDS OF RIGHTS SHOULD BENEFICIARIES HOLD 
ON REDISTRIBUTED LAND? 
The nature of beneficiaries’ land rights follows in a fairly straightforward manner from 
what was proposed above regarding land transfer. The key point is that there is a need 
to reconsider what is provided for in the State Land Lease and Disposal Policy, which is 
premised on the idea that all redistribution beneficiaries will be tenants, except that 
those towards the larger, more commercial end of the spectrum may exercise an option 
to purchase after a period of time (DRDLR, 2013). By contrast, it is vital to provide 
immediate certainty and security for settlement-oriented beneficiaries, which has the 
added benefit of not requiring the state to administer large numbers of leases for very 
small plots.  
5. WHAT KINDS OF SUPPORT SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO 
BENEFICIARIES? 
The difficult-to-stomach premise of this discussion on support for beneficiaries is that it 
is both unwise and unrealistic to predicate a successful land redistribution on infinitely 
stronger ‘post-transfer support’. Agricultural support services are in long-term crisis, 
quite apart from the responsibility for propping up land reform.24 Which is not to say 
that nothing should be done, only that there is little point in postulating that we need a 
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much more robust agricultural support system, even though we know it is not going to 
happen. 
 
In any case, this is a big topic about which much has been written. What I would rather 
offer here is what I regard as a few optimistic-but-feasible ideas as to what can be done, 
in particular for the benefit of small-scale farmers, including those who benefit from 
land reform: 
 
• Provide minimal but ongoing (non-monetary?) support for local farmers’ 
associations/unions, and commit to budget transparency. The argument is that a 
big problem with current agricultural support services is that they are not held 
accountable to anyone, and in particular farmers have little or no information 
with which to hold government offices accountable.25 
• Develop SME-based tractor services; these services already exist, and are the life-
blood of small-scale crop farmers in communal areas; but rather than support 
them, government tends to compete with them, or contract some of them as 
service providers for ill-conceived schemes such as Fetsa Tlala.  
• Promote household-based micro-irrigation; government is already doing this at a 
small scale; the unrealised potential and cost-effectiveness are significant, 
especially relative to new irrigation schemes based on large dams. 
• Promote more efficient informal and formal markets; just in case AgriParks do 
not pan out as planned, perhaps the government and/or its partners could 
promote relatively simple, low-cost approaches such as local farmers’ markets.  
As for large-scale farmer beneficiaries of land redistribution, the proposal is that the 
government adopts and refines the model of mentorship (as distinct from strategic 
partnerships) that, for example, is part of the Recapitalisation and Development 
Programme (RADP, but also popularly known as ‘Recap’). As with any mentorship 
programme, a great deal depends on the knowledge and attitude of the mentor;26 and as 
with any serious mentorship programme, there is scope for carefully selecting, actively 
monitoring and judiciously supporting mentors so that most mentors are above average. 
But under no circumstances should beneficiaries be obliged to have mentors. 
6. WHAT ARE THE DESIRED OUTCOMES OF SUCH 
REDISTRIBUTION? 
Let us suppose for a moment that we could get back to the all-time high annual 
redistribution budget (in real terms) of R4.5 billion that was available in 2011/12. If the 
scheme proposed above were to be followed, then very approximately the following 
numbers of beneficiaries and hectares could be accommodated in a year: 
 
 
                                                             
25 See e.g. Carden  (2014) and Aliber et al. (2017). 
26 Maka (forthcoming) found that some mentors under Recap – in particular existing black commercial farmers – are greatly appreciated by 
their mentees. There is an argument that established black farmers have a better appreciation of the constraints faced by land reform 
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Table 2: Indicative delivery levels for one year assuming budget of R4.5 billion 
Beneficiary type Number of 
beneficiary 
households 
Number of hectares Expenditure 
(R billion) 
Settlement-oriented        13 200             6 600           0.66  
Small-scale farmers          3 900           58 200           1.46  
Large-scale farmers              500         158 800           2.38  
All        17 600         223 600           4.50  
Assumptions: for settlement beneficiaries, 0.5 HA/HH at R100 000/HA; for small-scale farmers, 20 HA/HH at 
R25 000/HA; and for large-scale farmers, 300 HA/HH at R15 000/HA. 
 
 
While these numbers are not staggering, they must be put into perspective. First, 
although it is difficult to know because of lack of good data, around 2011/12 PLAS 
allowed for only around 1000 to 2000 beneficiary households per year rather than the 
17 600 estimated in the table. The difference of course owes to the fact that under the 
proposed scheme, a share of resources is in principle to be ring-fenced for smallholders. 
So from my perspective, this would be a big improvement. 
 
On the other hand, 17 600 is nothing. If it’s the case that around 2 million rural 
households need/want land (derived from Hall, 2013), then 17 600 is not discernible, 
although it starts to accumulate to something if it was to be achieved repeatedly over the 
next two decades. This is not to suggest that satisfying all 2 million households is a 
meaningful target, but it provides some benchmark against which the accommodation of 
17 600 can be gauged. Another possible reference point is the number of households 
living in informal settlements, which as of 2014 was about 1.5 million (Stats SA, 2015). 
 
Is the achievement so modest because of the expense of the land? Of course, free land 
would be cheaper! On the other hand, it is worth noting that even in this relatively pro-
poor scheme, half of the projected expenditure is for the benefit of the 3% of beneficiary 
households classified as large-scale – in other words, reaching larger numbers of 
households is also hindered by continuing to cater for large-scale farmer beneficiaries. 
Also relevant to this discussion is that the R4.5 billion per year is actually extremely 
modest in the greater scheme of things (see Appendix 2). By contrast, for 2018/19, the 
budget for housing development was R35 billion, and that for community development 
(which accompanies housing development) was R89 billion (National Treasury, 2018). 
Land redistribution has never been a spending priority, and it certainly isn’t now. 
 
For sake of argument, it is within the realm of possibility to, say, treble the above-
mentioned redistribution budget (e.g. eliminate Fetsa Tlala and state-funded agri-
parks, do not reopen restitution claims, curtail transfers to Bosasa…; but also, one could 
re-direct a share of the budget for housing and community development, because this 
programme would be catering in large measure to the same need, but less expensively), 
in which case there could be in the order of 50 000 beneficiary households per year, a 
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The cumulative figures over the next 20 years would then be as follows: 
Table 3: Indicative cumulative delivery assuming a budget of R13.5 bn per year over 20 
years 
Beneficiary type Number of 
beneficiary 
households 
Number of hectares Expenditure 
(R billion) 
Settlement-oriented 794 000 397 000       39.7  
Small-scale farmers 233 000 3 494 000       87.4  
Large-scale farmers 32 000 9 529 000     142.9  
All 1 059 000 13 420 000     270.0  
 
One million households is a significant number, for example relative to the 4.4 million 
rural households that exist presently, of which perhaps half to two-thirds live in poverty. 
This is not to say that all of these beneficiaries would become non-poor in the technical 
sense of moving from below to above the poverty line, but neither does addressing 
income poverty fully capture the idea of what such an approach would be trying to 
accomplish. The numbers of households are also significant in the sense that 233 000 is 
large relative to the current size of the commercially-oriented smallholder sector (about 
170 000), and given the fact that at present there are only about 25 000 to 30 000 large-
scale white commercial farmers. 
 
As for hectarage, 13 million hectares represent about 16% of commercial farmland, 
meaning that since democracy a total of about 25% of land would have become black-
owned via land reform (to which one could hopefully add a fair amount outside of land 
reform as well). However, the numbers of hectares actually acquired will depend on the 
type of land targeted and the effectiveness of the purchasing strategy. 
 
The total cost in present terms would be R270 billion, which is almost exactly the same 
as the budget estimate for social protection for the year 2019/20! Overall, the ‘pace of 
delivery’ would be dramatically more ambitious than what prevails now, but gradual 
enough to not cause significant chaos in the established commercial farming sector, 
which would be to the detriment of the poor.27 
 
In the short term, however, the most significant advantage of the above is that it would 
hopefully generate new lessons as to what works and what does not, including how to 
subdivide, how to identify suitable land for rural and peri-urban settlement, and how to 
undertake ‘managed land settlement’ at scale. The fact that we don’t know how to do 
these things more than two decades since the beginning of land reform is lamentable; 





                                                             
27 To clarify, the approach proposed here does not constitute a dramatic agrarian reform or over-turning of the prevailing agro-food system. 
We do not know how, and there is too little taste for it. What it would usher in however is a more balanced agrarian structure, as well as a 
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7. APPENDIX 1 – EXPROPRIATION WITHOUT 
COMPENSATION (EWOC) AS A MEANS OF 
ACCELERATING LAND REDISTRIBUTION – WHAT ARE THE 
PROSPECTS?  
 
It is difficult to imagine the kind of ‘EWOC programme’ that will meet the criteria of the African National 
Congress (ANC), that is, that will not negatively affect food security or the economy at large. What follows 
is therefore the author’s speculation as to what such a programme might look like. 
 
Since justice rather than economics are the core underlying consideration for EWOC in the first place, a 
plausible scenario is that an EWOC programme will assume a case-by-case assessment of how much 
different land owners ‘deserve’ to be stripped of their property. This in turn is likely to relate mainly to 
two considerations, namely the means/mode of acquisition, and the (perceived) extent of under-
utilisation, which could be taken to include the contribution of the property to the local and national 
economy.  
 
Very likely, an economy-sensitive EWOC programme will indemnify all institutional lenders, i.e. it will be 
pursued in a manner that seeks to be neutral to their loan books, at least in a direct sense. (This is also 
why a case-by-case examination will be required.) This in a sense will represent an upfront political 
challenge for the implementers of the programme, because it will make the programme more expensive 
than the popular image conjured by EWOC, and more tedious. (Presumably the bigger threat to the banks 
is what the broader programme does to rural real estate values at large, and thus to the value of its claims 
on borrowers’ property. Developing an accurate assessment of this risk is complicated by the fact that 
estimates as to the gross value of commercial farms vary wildly.) 
 
The further political/legal/psychological challenge to be confronted is what to do about what we might 
call ‘non-original white owners’, which represent a very large share of white owners. One outdated 
estimate is that between 1994 and 2008, about 63% of all privately-owned commercial farmland had 
changed hands through the market. Where land has stayed in the same family, it is presently owned by nth 
generation descendants, and at some stage government will have to take a position on the desirability of 
enshrining a legal principle based on a sort of ‘sins of the (great, great… grand-) father’ argument.  
 
Probably where most pressure will be exerted on current owners is regarding land use, i.e. to the extent 
that an EWOC programme will likely seek to target under-utilised land. To be sure, there is under-utilised 
land held by commercial farmers; this has been obliquely but convincingly illustrated by research and 
practice. In effect this is why the Elliot experience worked so well, and it is also why – within limits – 
willing-buyer/willing-seller also works. But as a decision criterion for a case-by-case process of 
investigation and judgement, it remains to be seen how it will work, especially since ‘under-utilisation’ 
and ‘non-utilisation’ are not at all the same thing. The significant decline over the past two to three 
decades in the total area cropped is widely regarded as a good thing; too much marginal land was being 
ploughed in response to generous subsidies, and their withdrawal from cropping has meant more area 
under extensive grazing. But who will determine the optimal land use in relation to which an assessment 
of current under-utilisation will be made? One safe predication is that current land owners will strive to 
give the appearance of full, appropriate land utilisation.  
 
In a nutshell, there is reason to doubt that an economy-sensitive, rule-of-law-based EWOC programme will 
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8. APPENDIX 2 – EXPENDITURE TRENDS OF LAND REFORM  
 
The purpose of the two charts below is to offer some perspective on expenditure trends in land reform.  
 
The first chart shows the inflation-adjusted expenditure trend from 1996/97 through 2016/17. It reveals 
that annual expenditure on restitution peaked in 2007/08, while that on redistribution it peaked in 
2008/09, and again in 2011/12. Taken together, the maximum expenditure on land reform took place in 
2008/09 (not shown). 
 
 
Data source: National Treasury, 2018. 
 
The second chart shows the expenditure on land reform in relation to that on other, selected functional 
responsibility areas. The figures are again adjusted for inflation, in the sense that expenditures for 
2008/09 are converted into 2016 Rand terms. The impressions are twofold: first, whereas expenditure on 
land reform was in decline over this interval, expenditure rose significantly for a number of other 
government functions. And second, regardless, expenditure on land reform is tiny relative to that on 
education, health, social protection, etc. Perhaps surprisingly, expenditure on land reform is on a par with 
expenditure on recreation and culture, and considerably less than expenditure on prisons. 
 
 
Data source: National Treasury, 2018. 
 
